The Turkish Army in 1854

The Turkish Army, some 220,000 strong, was one of the oldest standing armies in Europe. The Army of the Ottoman Empire, it was a cosmopolitan force, including Egyptians, Sudanese, Tunisians and Europeans from the Baltic and Eastern European dependencies. As such its potential and reliability was variable, although on the whole its fighting record was creditable. Ethnic Turkish troops were respected for their fighting qualities by all who had seen them in action.

In the past, the backbone of the Army had been provided by the elite Corps of Janissaries (lit. 'yani-tcheri' meaning 'new troops') recruited mainly from Bosnia, Albania and Bulgaria. Around 60,000 strong at their peak, their numbers had reduced by the beginning of the 19th Century, but they had grown in arrogance and indiscipline. Their perception of their power led to open disrespect for the Sultan, and when displeased about something, they liked to set fire to Constantinople. In 1806 Sultan Selim III decided he had had enough and he set out to fire them and replace them by a new ethnic Turkish force. The subsequent upheaval cost him his throne. A pitched battle saw the Artillery preventing the Janissaries from massacring their intended replacements, but these had to be disbanded, leaving the Janissaries still in place, although rather irritated by the whole episode.

By 1826 matters had come to a head, and Sultan Mahmud II determined to settle matters once and for all. He formed another Corps of intended elite regulars, known as the Eshkenjis. In June the Janissaries attempted a coup, hoping to carry the Eshkenjis with them. They failed, and their revolt was doomed. They were surrounded and pounded by artillery; when they refused to surrender they were shot down and their barracks burnt. In carnage on a massive scale some 10,000 Janissaries died, and surviving ringleaders hanged. The remaining rank and file were discharged and the Corps was disbanded.

Mahmud had solved his main problem, and he set about a radical redesign of the Army. A Military Academy was established in 1834, staffed at senior levels by highly competent foreign instructors. On his death in 1839 he was succeeded by Abdul Mejid, who pledged to continue the reform programme. More military schools were opened, and limited periods for conscription replaced the previous life sentence approach.

But the programme could only proceed at the pace which funding and active support at key levels would allow. The Sultan was only sixteen when he assumed power, and he displayed all the hedonistic vigour of gilded youth, doing his best to squander the family fortunes in the process. He almost succeeded in draining the last piastre from the Treasury, building a vast 300 room palace on the banks of the Bosphorus, including the world's largest ballroom, with a centrepiece chandelier weighing 4 tons. The government hit on the idea of debasing the coinage as an intended pain-free way of financing a huge budget deficit; the piastre went into 500% freefall. As a result, the ever-present kick-backs which had built themselves into the economy as part of standard costs, suddenly accelerated in scale and variety, and the Army saw its funding slow from a trickle to a drip. Officers themselves were used to a piece of the action, and were obliged to pocket more public money than before to try to keep their promotion bribery nest-egg up with the asking rate.

The lack of funds resulted in nearly all the programmes for modern uniforms, weaponry, equipment and services going on hold and the 1854 Army was obliged to make the best of it.

The bulk of the Army were infantry, armed with obsolescent short range smoothbore muskets. Dress was far from uniform apart from the red fez which was the universal headgear. The Infantry were organised on an ethnic basis, and consequently varied enormously in effectiveness. Turks, particularly those from Anatolia, were loyal and fearless fighters; they hated the Russians and many had hurried to enlist as the clamour for a jihad (holy war) built up during 1853. Other units composed of conscripts from the outposts of the Empire hated the Turks and were always looking for a chance to desert, despite knowing that they would be ritually flogged, almost certainly to death, if recaptured.

But even units conscripted by force were capable of fighting well. As always, much depended on the quality of the leadership. The Turkish officer corps had a poor reputation, but the Army had attracted many European officers from Britain, France, and the oppressed countries such as Italy, Poland and Hungary. There were also Americans commanding Turks. Although it would be harsh to describe them as mercenaries, as the prospect of regular pay was at best uncertain, they had for the most part volunteered to get a taste of the action in which the Turkish Army was almost constantly involved. They generally proved to be talented unit commanders, who as in any army soon gained the confidence of their troops once they had shown that they knew their job.

Infantry units had no administrative back-up, little if any transport and no organised ration service - often if troops could not live off the land they went hungry.

The Cavalry were of equally uncertain quality, and equally poorly equipped, as the Infantry. Their horses were generally smaller and older than considered desirable in the other armies - this was mainly a matter of local availability, as the British found out when scouring the area for remounts. In line with the modernisation policy, the Cavalry had recently adopted the Prussian straight-backed riding style with long stirrups, but had not yet mastered the associated drills or battle tactics. The exception to the rule was the small well equipped force led by the Pole Skender Bey, which boasted an excellent combat record.

At the other end of the scale were the irregular cavalry volunteers with a name straight out of a bedtime story book, the Bashi-Bazouks. In Turkish it means 'spoilt heads' a slightly obscure allusion to their total lack of discipline. They were a motley force of all ages some 14,000 strong, gathered by local leaders throughout the Empire whenever there was a good scrap in the offing, especially if it was all out war against the Russians, which as they were devout Moslems, they treated as a jihad. They refused any pay as they believed it would disqualify them from heavenly reward should they die for the cause. Dressed colourfully, if individually, they were superb horsemen. But the consequences of their beliefs and circumstances in the campaign environment were totally at odds with European practices and principles. They commonly fed and indulged themselves by ruthless pillage and rape of the local civilian population - 'we have to live' they explained - and systematically defiled the enemy dead. The Bashi-Bazouks would have difficulty fitting in with the Allied Army.

On the credit side, the quality of the support Arms remained high. The Artillery had acquired guns from the British, and their standard of gunnery was universally second to none. Turkish Engineers had always commanded international repect, and the current generation continued to be able to hold their own with their counterparts in the other armies. As most services were almost totally neglected, it was surprising to find strong emphasis on providing adequate medical care. One of the first reforms in the 1820s had been the establishment of an Army Medical Corps and a modern military medical college. Arrangements were made for most students to spend time in Western Europe to learn the latest medical and surgical skills. By the 1850s, Turkish military hospitals were as well equipped as those of the Russian and British Armies, and better than some.

A major problem for the Turkish Army was a bad image, due much to prejudiced outside judgements born of ignorance. The 'sick man of Europe' was presumed automatically to have a weak army. It did not occur to observers that the general poor state of dress and equipment might be due to lack of money rather than a lack of discipline and poor morale. Because social habits were different, they were derided. Moslems were not supposed to drink, and the troops spent their off duty hours keeping themselves to themselves, playing cards, backgammon or dominoes, or just sleeping. All the troops were rumoured to be homosexual - just how such grand scale intimate research might have been carried out is amazing to contemplate - and this provoked either genuine or defensive moral outrage amongst Europe's mid-19th century military men.

Those who served with Turks however, like this British Officer observing the 1853 Rumanian campaign, told a different story: "A Turk is every inch a soldier, eats whatever is given to him, obeys without a murmer, works like a horse, marches till he drops, draws his own water, cuts his own wood......if officered as they ought to be, and armed as they ought to be, (they) might once again make Europe tremble."

Illustration: Turkish officer 1854 Artwork from Campaign 6, Balaclava 1854, reproduced by permission of Osprey Publishing Ltd (c) Osprey Publishing Ltd

Sources

Robert B Edgerton Death or Glory - The Legacy of the Crimean War Westview Press 1999

Paul Kerr The Crimean War Boxtree 1997

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