Sardinia and the War - Part 1

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

by himself

Do I have any connection with the Crimean War? No.

Do I have any special competence in relation to the Crimean War? No.

Yes, in a dark past, long ago, I graduated in International Affairs, but never entered that profession (whatever that might be). Yes, I was for 35 years a reserve officer spending a lot of weekends in the 3D environment ('dust', 'dirt' and 'darkness', adding 'mud' as a fourth factor), but don't be mislead, two thirds were in the administrative support of the Medical Services. So how did I come to this Crimean War? By my grandfather and by accident. My army connection at last severed by the axe of age limit, I now have time to try to understand the stories my grandfather told time and again about his imprisonment during the Great War. He, a boy of 15 years old, was caught smuggling some Belgian refugees over the Belgian-Dutch border, and was held in custody for the rest of the war. In prison he was watched over by two old stewards originating from Southern Germany, who told him repeatedly of the great experience of their lifes: the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871.

Reading mainly French sources about this war, a striking point was the contrast the authors made between the clumsiness of the French generals in this conflict and their glorious deeds in the Crimea, 15 years earlier.

So a first link was laid to the Crimean War. That reminded me that the tower at the entrance of the 'Truppenübungsplatz Camp Vogelsang' in Germany was called 'Malakoff', a second link to the Crimea. And then, I remembered that in Paris on one of the bridges across the river Seine I have seen a giant martial statue of what I thought to be a French 'Poilu' and the inscription 'to our heroes of the Crimea'. So I shifted 15 years farther back in time -1870 could wait- and started searching for publications about this ignored Crimean War. The first booklet I found was French (Ch. Romagny: Campagnes d'un siècle: Crimée), and my initial impression was: 'no, the English can't be that stupid'. I looked further and 'found' Count de Bazancourt's narrative of the Crimean war and I thought 'no, the English can't be that stupid, can they?' This Crimean War had caught my attention, and I wanted to learn the English version. Although one can't deny the light in one's eyes - even the English can't - this was a completely different version, sometimes a completely different war. If the French and the English versions differed that much, what were the perceptions of the other parties: Russians, Turks and Sardinians? Unfortunately my Russian is not that good (I promise myself it will be improved in coming years), and Turkish is completely out of my reach. As for Italian, solidarity pays. Some fifteen years ago one of my colleagues was sent to Italy. In his preparation period I promised to learn Italian with him, giving me the opportunity to understand M. E. Sacchi's comments on the Italian Serie A football matches with 'La Moviola' in 'La Domenica Sportiva'. Today, the rights of the 'Serie A' matches have long been sold to one of the commercial television companies not on our cable. Nonetheless, enough remnants of understanding Italian are still present; enough to prove to me that the Italian version of the Crimean War is completely different from the traditional French or English accounts.

This Italian version I have tried to reconstruct, originates as much as possible from Italian sources and focuses on the Italian activities; no Alma or Inkerman, a little bit of Balaclava and Sevastopol and a lot of diplomatic intrigues (International Affairs, you know!).

Before I end and the narrative starts, one great wish: if ever I feel the need to start such a project over again, may the Great Lord use His Omnipotence and restrain me from starting such a thing. Yes, I enjoyed assembling this story, but for the last five months I feel I have lived like a hermit, trying to transform these Italian texts to something that resembles at a (great) distance the Queen's English. It was tough work. I am happy I did it, but I am equally happy that it is over.

Herman VAN MEIR

To Albert, Grand Master, Connaught Ranger, Who never believed in this project, (nor in me).

Sardinians? Piedmonts? Italians? Before the confusion starts, let's see what we are talking about.

Before 1713 Piedmont was under the house of Savoy, the main body of the Duchy of Savoy. In 1713, at the end of the War of the Spanish Succession, it acquired Sicily and became a kingdom. In 1720 Sicily was exchanged (with the Habsburg Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire) for Sardinia, and the new entity became the Kingdom of Sardinia. During the years of the French Revolution, Piedmont and Savoy were overrun by the French and incorporated in France. After Napoleon's defeat, the Kingdom of Sardinia was restored and extended with Genoa (1814), out of the Ligurian Republic. Turin was the center of the political life. From the point of view of population (under 5 million), Piedmont was by far the most important region:

SAVOY (French speaking) - 15%
SARDINIA (sparsely populated) - 15%
GENOA (mercantile and republican) - 10%
PIEDMONT - 60%

'Italy', by the way, was at that time merely a geographical notion, but in this 'Italy' the unification movements were popping up (CARBONARI, Young Italy and the RISORGIMENTO). So when we refer further to the Italian contribution to the Crimean war, 'Piedmont(s)', or 'Sardinia(ns)' cover the same notion, that is, if not mentioned differently in an explicit way.

So how did the Piedmont/Sardinians get into this war, which at first glance could have had no interest to them ? When, in April 1854, the French and British governments notified other nations of their intentions and invited them to join their coalition, it wasn't precisely the Piedmonts or any other government on Italian soil they had in mind. The Austrians in the first place, Sweden perhaps and maybe Prussia or Spain. But finally the only active contribution to the war in the Crimea came from Piedmont.

However a lot had to happen before the Piedmonts joined the coalition. Besides the drive to unification of the Italians, another important factor in bringing the Sardinians into the allied camp, was the work of the diplomats of Britain and France. Both were ministers plenipotentiary, we will call them here 'ambassadors'. James Hudson (44) and the still younger Duke de Guiche (34) played an important role in these events. (In March 1855, Guiche would inherit the title of Duke de Gramont and, under that name, became famous for the decisive role he played, as Minister of Foreign Affairs, in the French declaration of war on Prussia in 1870).

Italy, at the outbreak of the Crimean war, was still looking for a new equilibrium after the events of 1848-1849, the revolutionary period on the European continent. The Italians were still recovering from the thrashing they had received from the Austrians at Custozza and Novara. These defeats brought to an end the constitutional reforms in the Italian states, with the exception of Piedmont, which became a safe haven for the refugees from the States under Austrian influence, mainly from Lombardy.

Sardinian nationality was readily granted to refugees from other Italian states - the two brigade commanders of the 1st Sardinian Division of the Sardinian Corps in the Crimea, Fanti and Cialdini, were inhabitants of the Duchy of Modena. They took Sardinian nationality after 1848 (and adventurous careers). After the February 1853 uprisings in Milan, many participants (among them members of the highest social classes) fled to Piedmont and took Sardinian nationality. Austria replied by confiscating the property and possessions they had left behind them. Sardinia, being the only independent Italian kingdom that maintained its constitution (the 'Statuto), carried the hope for the Risorgimento and was, in Italy, considered the strongest center of opposition to Austria.

The first goal of the Italians on their way to unification was to get rid of the Austrians. Already in 1844, BALBO predicted a quarrel in the East, and saw opportunities for compensating the Austrians in the East (Danube Principalities) for the loss of influence they would incur in Italy, due to the unification of the latter. After Custozza and Novara, it became clear that 'Italia farà da sé' (Italy will do it by itself) would never work. The Italians would have to comply with the later Beatles song 'With a little help of my friends', if ever they wanted to clear their land of Austrians. To get the necessary allies, Italy had to prove that it was capable of installing a stable government, not threatened by continuous revolutions or uprisings and that it had an army able to protect it. The Crimean War came as a present from heaven.

The originator of the idea of entering the coalition can't be traced with certainty. Farini, Piedmont's former Minister of Education, is said to have launched the idea in a conversation with Cavour, who initially thought it unrealistic, but later changed his mind. The King, Victor Emmanuel, in a conversation with the French Ambassador, the Duc de Guiche, expressed already, on April 20th 1853, his will to be an ally of the French against Austria if the latter should join the Russians.

After July 5th 1853, when the Russians occupied the Danube Principalities, Piedmont sent some officers of the Sardinian Army to Turkey. The former President of the Chamber of Representatives, Pinelli, who was a reserve officer, and Captain Govone, who was sent to the Headquarter of Omar Pasha, without any official mission (later he was to be attached to the Sardinian Headquarters). Other Piedmonts were present at their own initiative: Gardino, in Turkish service; Lt Crespi, a cavalry officer, during his holidays. Captain Govone, a young engineer officer (not yet 30 years old) played an arguably decisive role in the defense of Silistria (May-June 1854). He made the plan for the inner redoubt to protect the city if the works of the Arab-Tabia were taken by the Russians. The construction of this new redoubt prevented the Russians from taking Silistria immediately. In combination with the Austrian attitude, it played an important role in their decision to raise the siege. Later on, in 1858, Todleben, who had thought Capt. Butler responsible for the Silistria defenses, planned to change the itinerary of his voyage through Europe in order to meet this Govone.

Govone moved with the allies to the Crimea and, together with Lt Landriani of the Piedmont Cavalry, he took part in the Charge of the Light Brigade on October 25th. Both were wounded: Govone lightly in the shoulder, and Landriani severely in the leg. Landriani was taken prisoner and sent to Simferopol but was later released unilaterally by the Russians. He could not continue to serve and died of his wounds in 1858. Govone for his part continued his stay in the Crimea and was a first hand witness and reporter for the home front until early February 1855.

Before the naval battle at Sinope, the chances for a peaceful settlement were still high, on the basis of withdrawal of the Russian troops from the Danube Principalities and a subsequent withdrawal of the British and French fleets from the Black Sea. But after Sinope it was clear that they were heading for a war. The French Emperor sent out some information gatherers. Brenier was sent to Italy 'to negotiate a new postal treaty', in fact to assess the attitudes in the Italian States towards the coming conflict. In Piedmont he found that the confiscation of the property and possessions of the Lombard refugees in Piedmont, who had taken Sardinian nationality, had great influence on the local opinion. The King was ready to act but the government was reacting prudently because it feared that refugees and extremists might take up arms. Shortly after Sinope, James Hudson, the British Ambassador in Piedmont, on the instructions of Lord Clarendon, asked Cavour if the British could hire 10.000 - 15.000 Piedmontese in the event of a campaign against Russia. In January 1854, Cavour discussed with the King the possibility of a Sardinian participation alongside the allies. From the beginning, the King didn't leave any room for misinterpretation of his willingness to take part in the coalition. He himself or his younger brother Ferdinand, the Duke of Genoa, would lead the Sardinian Army.

In February 1854, on the occasion of the inauguration of the railway between Turin and Genoa, Cavour took the opportunity to talk about a Sardinian participation in a coalition against Russia to Count Toffetti, a Lombard refugee, who was in quite close contact with Hudson. In this way he had informal access to Hudson, by way of which he could channel his ideas or intentions to the English representative.

The main objective of the French and the British (at that time still not yet allies) was to bring Austria into their coalition. Knowing the importance for the Austrians of keeping their interests in Italy secured, the French 'Moniteur' published on February 22nd 1854 an article stating that, if the French and the Austrians would be fighting united in the East, it was hardly conceivable that they would be in conflict in the Alps. This suggested a direct link between a status quo in Italy and an Austrian entry into the coalition.

Piedmont reacted furiously. From France came the explanation that this article wasn't aimed at Piedmont but at the revolutionists and/or extremists who wanted to profit from an opportunity to attack Austria possibly weakened at home in the absence of an expeditionary corps deployed against Russia.

On March 27th 1854, war with Russia was declared by the French and the British (the Allies) and on April 10th, the Treaty of Alliance between France and Britain was signed. The Treaty was communicated to other nations to which an invitation was made to join the Alliance. This invitation was merely a suggestion to show their sympathy rather than a real offer to enter the Coalition. On June 2nd, Dabormida replied officially, in a polite, prudent way expressing his sympathy for their cause. But in reality the events were quite different.

Shortly after the notification, on April 18th, Scarlett, the British representative in Tuscany, met Landucci, the Minister of Foreign Affairs. A copy of the note of this meeting was sent to Hudson. In this meeting Landucci complained about the behavior of Piedmont, which, in his view, was just looking for an opportunity to start a new war. Austria, said Landucci, couldn't adhere to the Alliance as long as there was a threat in Italy. Radetzky, the Commander-in-Chief of the Austrians in Italy, wanted a Garrison in Alessandria (between Turin and Genoa). Hudson discussed the Scarlett-note first with Dabormida and later with Cavour. The latter, of course, reacted furiously and replied that Piedmont had no aggressive intentions and was willing, at the request of the Allies, to put an expeditionary corps of about one third of the Sardinian army (14 - 15.000 man) at the their disposal. To Hudson, this proposal sounded wonderful and he asked Cavour to inform Guiche. But before going to Guiche, Cavour held Council with his fellow ministers ... and he was not followed by his colleagues. Only Cibrario supported him. The others found plenty of reasons to oppose the President of the Council: financial reasons, for the state's finance was in a parlous state due to previous operation; the state of the army, which was to be reorganized; the abrogation of the sequestration in Lombard as compensation for this effort.... Questioned by La Marmora: "Who is to pay for it?", Cavour replied "England, I presume". So Cavour had to go back to Hudson to tell him that his earlier proposal was made in his own name and not on behalf of the government. In the meantime, Hudson had already sent a memo to London. From London the news came to Paris and Guiche, who was till that moment left in the dark, was instructed to inquire. In a meeting with Dabormida this letter had to confirm Cavour's declaration to Hudson but immediately added conditions. It was not a firm governmental engagement; security in Italy would have to be guaranteed, the property sequestration must be abrogated, and the sacrifices inherent in fighting a war should be rewarded with some (territorial) advantages.

Guiche sought confirmation with Cavour who, although he felt himself bound by his statement, reiterated the guaranties asked earlier by Dabormida. This divergence of opinion between the Sardinian ministers, which eventually led to Dabormida's resignation, had to be investigated. Some days after the official answer of Dabormida (June 6/7), Guiche visited the King, who confirmed that Cavour's April statement was completely in line with his own feelings and that Cavour, in that meeting, has perfectly transmitted the King's ideas.

At that moment the situation in the East seemed to be coming rapidly to a conclusion. The Allies were in Varna, Austria and Prussia had entered into an agreement against Russia, and the Russians had withdrawn from the Principalities. The reason for an intervention by the British and the French had gone, but the allies decided on confrontation with Russia in the Crimea.

Within the Sardinian government, Cavour with Cibrario and La Marmora were in favour of Sardinia joining the Coalition. Rattazzi and Dabormida were still opposed. At a French request to put some ships at the disposal of the allies, Dabormida, in order not to loose neutrality, responded once again politely but negatively (October 22nd, 1854). During the discussion of the Foreign Affairs budget, on December 2nd, Dabormida declared that with respect of the war with Russia, Sardinia was free of any obligation.

In that same month of December, after the Battles of Balaclava and Inkerman and the November 14th hurricane, it became clear that the siege of Sevastopol would last through the winter. The Allies were in desperate need of reinforcements especially the British, who on November 27th introduced their Foreign Enlistment Bill. On November 29th Lord Russell and Lord Clarendon wrote - the latter 'privately' - to Hudson to check whether the Sardinian government was ready to put at the disposal of the British a corps of 15,000 men, to be sent to the Crimea to serve alongside the British army. By a mistake in the postal distribution, the letters did not arrive in Turin until December 12th. During this interval the French and the British had put some pressure on the Austrians to enter their coalition. On December 2nd, they entered into a treaty stating that, if before the end of the year peace wasn't restored, England, France and Austria would enter into negotiations on 'efficient means to come to the objective of their alliance'. London and Paris thought the Austrians were, at last, in their coalition. The King of Sardinia anxiously asked Dabormida to check whether, with respect of Italy, some secret articles in this treaty could hamper the Sardinian interests. His worry was not without a cause. Some days later, December 22nd, the French and the Austrians entered into a secret agreement to prevent attacks in Italy against the territorial integrity of the states that were held by Austria.

The alliance of Austria with France and Britain was seen as a 'fait accompli', also in Piedmont. The feeling was that, if in the near future Austria should back out, the Sardinian government ought to grasp the opportunity to supplant it with a dashing and seemingly unselfish initiative.

This was the situation when Hudson received Russell's and Clarendon's letters. 'Put at the disposal of the British' could mean two things, hired and paid by the British and put under the command of Lord Raglan, or the entering of Sardinia into the Treaty of Alliance of April 10th, and financing the expedition at its own expense. Before these letters arrived in Turin, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Drouyn de Lhuys, had asked London to invite Sardinia to adhere in full to the April 10th Treaty. In this démarche Hudson should take the lead, seconded by Guitaut (chargé d'affaires in replacement of Guiche, on leave in France). On December 13th, Hudson immediately communicated the letters to Dabormida. The Council of Ministers started to debate them and got orders from the King. From the start, the mercenary option was rejected. The Sardinian army, being an army of conscripts, could not be asked to fight (shed blood) for a foreign nation in a foreign country. The Sardinian government was ready to adhere, under honorable conditions, to the Treaty of April 10th (these 'honorable conditions' being the abrogation of the sequestration in Lombardy). Both Hudson and Guitaut immediately informed their governments and got an immediate reply. Sardinia should enter the Treaty without restrictions and should be prepared to send a corps of 10,000 man. The same day, December 14th, the Council of Ministers came together under the presidency of the King. The King and Cavour were in favor of unconditionally signing up to the Treaty of Alliance. Dabormida and (less strongly) Rattazzi wanted the abrogation of the Lombard sequestration as a condition. The council compromised: an official note and a secret annex (note réversale) would be handed over. In the official note Sardinia would adhere to the treaty and put at the disposal of the allies a corps of 15,000 man under Sardinian command. Financed by a British loan of 20 million pounds sterling to be granted at a rate of 3%, and a declaration by the two allies that, when peace was restored, the sacrifices of the Sardinian government, in men and money, would be taken into account.

Two articles figured in the secret annex; the allied powers would do their utmost to make Austria abrogate the sequestration and would take into consideration the State of Italy at the restoration of peace. That was all, except for a telegram of Dabormida to Villamarina, the Sardinian Ambassador in Paris, to get a guarantee that the Treaty of December 2nd between the Allies and Austria didn't contain any article that could hamper any interests of Piedmont or Italy.

In view of the French and British eagerness to get Austria into their coalition, the acceptance of the secret annex by London or Paris was wishful thinking. From London came the answer that the secret articles would prevent Piedmont's entrance to the Treaty alliance. For some weeks there was a stalemate, till, at the start of the new year, Guiche returned to Turin. On January 1st, 1855, King Victor Emmanuel met Count Ottavio Thaon di Revel, the former Minister and leader of the right (conservatives and clericals), and Mgr Charvaz, Archbishop of Genoa. The King complained about the Cavour cabinet, its attitude towards the proposition in the sub alpine parliament to abolish the religious congregations and the way that they handled the Sardinian entrance into the treaty of April 10th. He proposed Thaon di Revel to replace Cavour.

There then followed a round of gossip. Guiche, on January 2nd, 1855, paid a visit to the King and was informed of the conversation of the latter with Revel and Charvaz. He informed Count de Salmour, member of the sub alpine parliament and his cousin by marriage. Salmour, who was a close friend of Cavour, informed the latter about the meeting of the King with Revel. Cavour replied that he was, from the start, in favor of the unconditional Sardinian entrance to the alliance, but that some other ministers were opposed. Salmour advised his friend to get rid of these ministers and to stick to his original idea. He also informed Guiche that the Sardinian government would decide on an adherence that evening in a meeting they had with the two ambassadors. Knowing the position of the King and Cavour, Guiche, supported by the last dispatches of both governments declined the 'note réversale', much to the surprise of Dabormida, who thought it accepted. Entering into an unfruitful discussion Hudson produced the message from Clarendon, stating that no feelings of sympathy or unofficial promises had to be expressed in solemn declaration. Guiche had the same instructions.

The meeting took an unexpected turn, as it was announced that the Council of Ministers had decided to send La Marmora to the French Emperor to explain their attitude towards the 'note réversale'. Guiche was furious. He saw this voyage as a personal humiliation, not acceptable to him, and stated that insistence on the voyage of La Marmora would torpedo the negotiations. Cavour saw that an unconditional adherence was the only possible way to get out of this situation. In a last effort to link the sequestration to this important step of the Sardinian government, he proposed to put the reservations of the Sardinian government into a separate protocol. This suggestion was accepted by the two ambassadors albeit on a series of conditions (not to make it public, not to be seen as a judgment on the present situation, not to refer to 'Italy'....) During the time the ambassadors made up the texts the Sardinian government deliberated, Cavour and La Marmora accepted the solution, Dabormida was opposed, Rattazzi rather hostile. When the ambassadors returned, Cavour decided to accept in the name of the government and went immediately with the two texts to the King who approved them without hesitation. On Cavour's return, Dabormida resigned. The next day, January 10th, the protocol was signed and, with projects of an Act of Adhesion and of a Military Convention, sent to London and Paris.

Sources:

Guiseppe GOVONE 1905: Mémoires 1848-1870 Paris Albert Fontemoing Editeur

Uberto GOVONE 1920: Il Generale Giuseppe Govone ; Frammenti di Memorie Torino Fratelli Bocca Editori

Pier Giusto JAEGER 1991: Le Mura di Sebastopoli Milano Arnoldo Mondadori Editore

Christoforo MANFREDI 1956: La Spedizione Sarda in Crimea nel 1855-56 Roma Stato Maggiore Esercito

Paul MATTER 1925 : Cavour et l'Unité Italienne T. 2 Paris Librairie Félix Alcan

Franco VALSECCHI 1968: Il Risorgimento e l'Europa : L'Alleanza di Crimea Firenze Vallecchi Editore

Benjamin VINCENT 1966: Haydn's Dictionary of Dates Graz Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt