Why the South Lost or How the North Won? : A Perception of the American Civil War
At the onset of hostilities both the North and the South were woefully unprepared to fight a long, full-scale war. Though, in terms of comparison, the manpower and materials of the North were vastly superior to those of the South. Despite these overwhelming odds, Southerners believed they had a fighting chance and adopted a strategy to take into account their strengths and weaknesses. The North was able to begin the war with numerous advantages over the South. First, the North had an established government and therefore did not have to waste time trying to set up a governing system as did the South. Second, almost all of the nation's industry was located in the North. This diversified industry allowed the North the ability to mass produce adequate amounts of artillery, rifles, and munitions which permitted the North the ability to fight a protracted, modern war. The South on the other hand lacked any major industrial facilities that could mass produce weapons. Third, the majority of the nation's farms were in the North. This provided agricultural resources for an army and its civilians. In contrast, Southern farms primarily produced staple crops like cotton, tobacco and sugar cane. This made it difficult to have adequate food to feed an army, not to mention the civilian population. Fourth, the North enjoyed control over the transportation system. Of the 30,000 miles of railroads the North controlled 20,000 of them. Additionally, the North began the war with an existing Navy and the ability to expand its naval resources. However, the South had no navy of which to speak and few resources to build one. Finally, the North had a much greater population on which to draw from in fighting the South. The twenty-three Northern states with a population of 22 million people greatly overshadowed the eleven Southern states with a population of 9 million (of which included 3 million slaves). Despite these overwhelming odds, the South believed it had a chance to win its independence.
Jefferson Davis and Southern leaders were aware of the differences in terms of manpower and materials, yet they strongly believed that they could be victorious. Despite numerous disadvantages, the South entered the war with some important advantages. First it possessed a long military tradition. The military was regarded as an honorable profession and the South had a large number of professionally trained men to command their armies. Many of the country's top ranked officers like Robert E. Lee and Joseph Johnston resigned their commissions in order to fight for the Confederacy. As a result Lincoln was left without a supply of adequate military leaders. Second, the South hoped to gain resources and enlist the support of the boarder states as well as some European countries, particularly England and France. The Confederate government believed that if the South stopped shipping cotton to these countries that they would enter the war. Finally, the South began the war with a concrete war aim, they were fighting for independence. In fact Davis likened the goals of the Confederacy to that of the American patriots. As a result, the South adopted a strategy like that of George Washington in the American Revolution. The plan, known as attrition, called for a strategy of winning the war by avoiding losing. That is, the South did not have to match the North's resources, they only needed to avoid full-scale battles and prolong the war making it too costly for their opponents.
Stay tuned for part 2 of this article coming next month. It will examine why the attrition strategy was modified by the Confederate high command. Also next month's article will address the signs of weakness evident in the Confederacy due to key military setbacks, weak leadership, and a faltering economy.
Sources: James M. McPherson, "American Victory, American Defeat." In Why the Confederacy Lost. Edited by Gabor S. Boritt. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992.
James M. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era. New York: Oxford University Press, 1988.
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